Richard Clark Interview, 11 July 2003

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TT:Is that what you would normally do? That stuff would come to you during the day and you would have to work on it?
RC:Yeah, it would come to us during the day but we, you know—
TT:But this was more interesting?
RC:Yeah, you see, scoring the bomb runs was not our major priority. Our major priority was keeping up with the intelligence of the day, we were always—virtually always updating the bombing information for what we were going to do if we came to war and go over Russia, I mean this was not a—
TT:Oh, that was your priority.
RC:Yeah, that was the priority. We always got the film scored, but sometimes we'd be a day or two days behind because it's not going to make a huge difference. But this turned into a priority so we informed the photo lab that we wanted it now.
TT:Now you say it turned into a priority, can you explain that?
RC:Well, the people were concerned about what it was. The bomb wing people because the crew was a little bit upset about what they'd seen.
TT:Yeah. So what you're saying, is that there was concern, and it was passed on down to you to figure out—
RC:Take a look at the film. Because if I remember right, I think it was three alarms that went off in missile silos.
TT:You remember that?
RC:I believe so. I mean, I think there were three alarms that went off in different missile silos, and they never did find anything.
TT:At what point do you hear about that?
RC:That same day.
TT:Officially, or was it, you know, talk?
RC:[Pauses] I don't remember for sure.
TT:But that was part of the whole information package.
RC:Yeah that—and I don't even remember who the CO was at that time. See, there was a lieutenant—when I first went there, there was a lieutenant colonel that was in charge of

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