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HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

FY 1969

HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 116 (U)

VOLUME I

NARRATIVE

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OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
MARCH 1970

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FOREWORD

Many changes took place in the Air Force Historical Program in 1969. One of these was to change the submission of command histories from a semi-annual to an annual basis, consequently this history covers fiscal year 1969. Although this history is an entity it should be remembered that many of the events had their beginnings in the past and are covered in former histories that go back to the origin of the command in 1946.

Although prepared at command headquarters this is a command rather than a headquarters history. Emphasis in this history, as in past histories, is placed on plans and operations connected with the command's principal weapons systems. This work consists of 22 volumes. The narrative is contained in volumes I, II, III, while volumes IV thru XXII contain the supporting documents that substantiate and expand upon the narrative. Supporting documents are identified in the footnotes with Ex_____.

Historians who performed research and writing in connection with this history are: Chapters I and II, Miss Mary E. Hayes; Chapter III, Mr. Lynn A. Peake and Mr. Jerry N. Hinds; and Chapter IV, Mr. Sheldon A. Goldberg.

John T. Bohn
Command Historian
30 March 1970
CHAPTER I

MISSION, RESOURCES, ORGANIZATION

Introduction

(U) This chapter discusses the mission, resources, and organization of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in its dual role as a specified command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and as a major command of the United States Air Force (USAF). Emphasis is given to discussions of available resources, future requirements, and changes in organization.

Mission

(FOUO) SAC's mission remained unchanged during Fiscal Year 1969 (FY-69). As a major command of USAF it was required to "organize, train, equip, administer, and prepare strategic forces for aerospace combat, including offensive strikes, reconnaissance, and special missions." In its role as a specified command of the JCS, the command must "maintain a high state of readiness to wage a strategic nuclear war," to support military operations in Southeast Asia (SEA), and be prepared to attack targets as required by other commands with nuclear and/or nonnuclear weapons. Reflecting these mission statements, SAC's Basic War Plan stated it was:

"... to be capable of immediate response to all demands of national policy, throughout the spectrum of warfare considered today, from cold through limited to all-out general war. To accomplish this mission, SAC maintains a force prepared to conduct aerospace operations on a global basis, separately or in concert with other US or allied commands in demonstration of US intent to resist aggression; and to maintain the capability to destroy the war making capacity of the aggressor in a manner calculated to bring about defeat on terms advantageous to the United States. Strategic Air Command (SAC), in concert with the other unified and specified commands is tasked as set forth in the JSCP (Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan).

* The words "a high state of readiness" replaced "a continuous capability" for the FY-69 period.
The above statement was included in a new War Plan that became effective on 1 July 1968, replacing one dated 1 July 1966. There were no major changes from the older plan, although the mission statement was completely rewritten. Other than bringing up to date information on such subjects as intelligence, two minor changes were made: one moved the section on recovery and reconstitution from a separate annex to the operations annex, i.e., from Annex L to Annex A; and added an annex on dispersal of aircraft under emergency conditions.

(SG) SAC proposed two revisions to the mission regulation. One would identify SAC responsibilities in close air support; the other would remove aerial mine laying operations from a collateral to a primary mission status.

(SG) Close air support for ground troops was a function usually identified with tactical operation; however, since 18 June 1965 SAC had effectively used its B-52 strategic weapons systems for saturation bombing in Southeast Asia (SEA). Thus, SAC recommended to USAF that this tactical support function be defined in the regulation. USAF recognized the need, but changed SAC's proposed wording pointing out that the words "close air support" did not fully define saturation bombing since such activity also filled both interdiction and intra-theater strategic roles. They added one word (underlined) and deleted 12 (indicated by .-) in SAC's proposed statement:

(SG) Employ strategic bombers for precise saturation pinpoint bombing of these targets which are beyond the capability of fighter close air support designated by the area commander being supported.

SAC objected to the word "designated," as it implied the area commander would have complete control over target selection, and USAF concurred. SAC modified the paragraph slightly and submitted it to Tactical Air Command (TAC): "Employ strategic bombers for precise saturation bombing of point or area targets in support of area commanders."

* (U) The quoted paragraph would appear as (a) under 3.a.(5), which read: "Support other commanders under JCS in their missions as JCS directs."
(U) TAC approved with the provision that the section of the
mission regulation outlining SAC's special responsibilities be
amended to include a statement requiring coordination with them for
this type of operation.¹¹ SAC recognized that this emphasized
TAC's area of responsibility, but considered that since the tactics
employed were peculiar to strategic bombing, the statement would
not be required.¹²

The second change was proposed after receiving the JSCP
for Fiscal Year 1970 (FY-70). The JSCP added a new paragraph to
SAC's mission statement which required SAC to:¹³

(¶) Prepare, coordinate, and maintain plans, in support
of CINCLANT (Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic), USCINCEUR (United
States Commander-in-Chief, Europe), and CINCPAC (Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Command) for the conduct of aerial minelaying
operations in antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

In SAC's existing mission regulation aerial mine laying operation
was a collateral, rather than a primary, responsibility. SAC re-
quested that it become a primary mission statement: "Conduct aerial
minelaying operations in support of CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, and CINCPAC."¹⁴

(¶¶) SAC also asked for deletion of the requirement to support
the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC) in developing and maintaining
techniques for conducting antisubmarine warfare in defense of the
Continental United States (CONUS).¹⁵ The command considered this
desirable since SAC was to support CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and CINCEUR
in minelaying and should work directly with them.¹⁶ However, SAC
did not object to continuing to support ADC in other phases of
antisubmarine warfare.¹⁷ ADC did not agree. It was the USAF com-
mand responsible for antisubmarine warfare in defense of CONUS, and
therefore would coordinate plans with the Navy.¹⁸ SAC replied that
since it had been tasked by JCS to conduct aerial minelaying, it

* (U) Paragraph 3.b.: "... to develop and maintain the technique
of employing strategic aerospace forces in: (1) interdiction
of enemy seapower through aerospace operations. (2) Anti-
submarine warfare and protection of shipping. (3) Aerial
mine laying operations."
could accomplish that mission by direct coordination. USAF made no suggestions to resolve this disagreement, and stated that all proposed changes would be submitted to the interested commanders for comment prior to publication of a new SAC mission regulation.

Resources

The JSCP for FY-69 stated that the United States' basic national security objective was the preservation of the nation's freedom and independence. The national military strategy was one of deterrence of hostile acts by potential aggressors. To support this strategy SAC must have the recognized capability in retaliation to assure a high level of destruction to the aggressor's homeland, while at the same time limiting destruction to the U.S. Heavy and medium bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles maintained the integrity of the deterrence strategy. A portion of the heavy bomber fleet had been modified to carry conventional weapons. This provided additional flexibility for SAC to participate in contingency actions associated with non-nuclear conflicts. SAC's forces operated from both U.S. and overseas bases. The following table shows the SAC resources at the end of Fiscal Years 1968 and 1969, and the changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>End of FY-68</th>
<th>End of FY-69</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>+32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>182,136</td>
<td>161,315</td>
<td>-20,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases Owned</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, RESOURCES
End, Fiscal Years 1968, 1969, Change
Weapons Systems: FY-69

The JSCP* included 34 B-52 squadrons with a strength of 510 aircraft at the beginning of the fiscal year; however, this was reduced to 30 squadrons and 450 aircraft by the end of FY-69.23 Both the total number of operational aircraft and the number of B-52s available to SAC were reduced. Thirty-three of the available 83 B-52Es were transferred from non-operational active (NOA) status to permanent storage.24 This action was in accord with the policy of gradually reducing the number of older B-52s in the inventory (the C, E, and F models). This left the Ds, flying conventional bombing missions in SEA, and the newer G and H models.25

The JSCP included six B-58 medium bomber squadrons for FY-69. The Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), published in August 1968, authorized 81 aircraft, a drop of three from the previous year.26 SAC had 71 aircraft in inventory at the end of FY-69, and the Air Force Logistics Command had eight in modification work. This total of 79 was three less than had been available at the beginning of the year. The loss of three was due to accidents.

The JSCP force tabulation of 41 squadron/615 KC-135 refueling tankers for FY-69 was the same as in FY-68, and did not change during the year. SAC's inventory at the end of FY-69 included 626 KC-135s.

* (U) The JCS' JSCP and DOD's DPM are used as sources for SAC's weapons systems authorizations. The JSCP provided guidance for the one year short term range, and included the statement of mission and the number of operational squadrons. A ratio of 15 aircraft for each SAC squadron was used for B-52 and FB-111; there were insufficient B-58 to apply that ratio. The DPM, based on JCS' JSCP (Joint Strategic Objectives Plan), supplied actual numbers of weapons systems. It was effective the year issued, and projections were made for eight years. The JSOP was prepared by inputs by the services, and provided guidance for eight years starting subsequent to two years from the publication date.
Twenty-six strategic missiles squadrons were included in the JSCP with 1000 Minuteman* and 54 Titan II missiles authorized in the DPM. While these totals did not change during the year, the distribution of models within the Minuteman inventory did as the result of continued phase out of the Minuteman I (LGM-30A, LGM-30B), and an accompanying increase in the Minuteman II (LGM-30F).^27

A table on the following page shows the data discussed above.

SAC's B-52s and B-58s could carry B28, B41, B43, B53, and BA53 nuclear weapons, as required by the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Also, all 150 available B-52Ds were modified to carry conventional weapons, and 105 were being used in SEA during FY-69. In addition, the B-52s carried the AGM-28, "Hound Dog," air launched missile, 340 of which were authorized in the DPM. However, only 311 were in SAC's inventory at the end of FY-69, a loss of six during the year. The use of 10 missiles for testing was partially offset by return of four from IRAN (inspection and repair as necessary).

The ADM-20 decoy, the "Quail," was also carried by some B-52G/H aircraft. Four hundred forty-five were in the SAC inventory during the year.

Future Force Structure

Draft Presidential Memorandum. The annual DPM was received by SAC in August 1968. Its concepts of minimum deterrence and assured destruction were the bases for force structure for FY-69 to FY-77. Existing strategic offensive forces "provide a more than adequate Assured Destruction capability" when the expected Soviet threat was examined. However, the DPM stated that the U. S. should retain its

* The DPM figure was actually 99 squadron Minuteman missiles, which excluded six launchers reserved for the Emergency Rocket Communications System; however, since 1000 is the usually quoted figure for Minuteman inventory, it is used here.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons Systems</th>
<th>1 Jul 68</th>
<th>30 Jun 69*</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers, Heavy, B-52</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrions/Aircraft, JSCP</td>
<td>34/510</td>
<td>36/450</td>
<td>-1-/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, SAC **</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, AFLC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, Total</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers, Medium, B-58</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrions, JSCP/Aircraft, DPM</td>
<td>6/84</td>
<td>6/81</td>
<td>0/-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, SAC **</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, AFLC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, Total</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tankers, Heavy, KC-135</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrions/Aircraft, JSCP</td>
<td>41/615</td>
<td>41/615</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, SAC **</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, AFLC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, Total</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrions, JSCP/Missiles, DPM</td>
<td>26/1054</td>
<td>26/1054</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missiles, Minuteman I</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles, DPM</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, SAC</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missiles, Minuteman II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles, DPM</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>+100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, SAC</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>+98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missiles, Titan II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles, DPM</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory, SAC</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Aircraft and Missile inventory data as of 3 July 1969.

** Aircraft requiring modification/maintenance work lasting over 30 days were assigned to the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).
(TOP SECRET) . . . we believe that the strategic forces of the United States can inflict serious losses on the Gino-Soviet complex in a nuclear exchange. We are not equally confident, however, that for the foreseeable future, we could engage the enemy successfully at all levels of nuclear exchange with the programmed force. We do not feel that we as a nation can be conservative with our deterrent.

(TOP SECRET) We are concerned that the Soviet buildup and their emphasis on R&D (research and development) suggested they intend to make the most of their opportunities. We hope that our intelligence will reveal new threats in sufficient time for us to go through the lengthy process of fielding proven countermeasures. But as we see it, the deterrent equation functions most reliably when forces in-being are evident and are structured to provide the NCA (National Command Authority) with multiple options to fight and to win conventional or nuclear war.

Bases

(U) The assigned aircraft and missiles were located at 28 SAC owned and ten tenant bases in the CONUS, ** and at three SAC and five tenant bases overseas. The total of 31 owned bases was a decrease of two due to the transfer, on 1 July 1968, of Homestead AFB, Florida, and Altus AFB, Oklahoma, to the Tactical Air Command and the Military Airlift Command, respectively. The number of tenant bases increased from nine to ten as SAC remained a tenant at Altus. A map of active bases is on the following page.

(U) SAC had two excess bases, Biggs AFB, Texas, and Glasgow AFB, Montana. This was one less than in June 1968 as the result of the transfer of Dow AFB, Bangor, Maine, to the U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer, State of Maine, on 1 July. All SAC personnel departed

* (U) Tenant status was defined as when a unit of wing level organization or above was located at a base owned by another major command; the exceptions are Ching Chuan Kang, Altus and Travis where air refueling squadrons were assigned.

** (U) The definition of CONUS was that used for the USAF program document, PD-70-3: the contiguous 48 states were considered as CONUS, while Alaska and other areas were overseas.
SAC ACTIVE BASES
30 June 1969

Owned: Offutt
Tenant: (Altus)
Satellite: (Homestead)

\begin{itemize}
  \item Fairchild
  \item Malmstrom
  \item Ellsworth
  \item KI Sawyer
  \item Plattsburgh
  \item Griffiss
  \item Grissom
  \item Wright-Patterson
  \item Lockbourne
  \item Seymour-Johnson
  \item Loring
  \item Pease
  \item Westover
  \item Barksdale
  \item McCoy
  \item Alto
  \item Dyess
  \item Carswell
  \item Clinton-Sherman
  \item Francis E Warren
  \item Offutt
  \item Whiteman
  \item McConnell
  \item Vandenberg
  \item March
  \item Davis-Monthan
  \item Andersen, Guam
  \item Goose, Labrador
  \item Ramey, Puerto Rico
  \item (Ching Chuan Kang, Taiwan)
  \item (Eielson, Alaska)
  \item (Kadena, Okinawa)
  \item (Torrejon, Spain)
  \item (U-Tapao, Thailand)
\end{itemize}
by early December, and the 4251 Air Base Squadron (ABS) was inactivated 2 December 1968. Upon transfer it was redesignated as Bangor International Airport. At Glasgow the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to operate and maintain the base at the minimum sustaining level. SAC's 4257ABS was still there at the end of FY-69.

(3) In February 1969 satellite basing of bombers and tankers began. This would place B-52s, B-58s, and KC-135s at CONUS locations other than those normally owned or tenanted by SAC. The objective was primarily to spread the alert force over a larger number of bases, and thereby reduce the time required to launch the entire force, and secondarily to complicate a potential enemy's timing by increasing the number of targets he must consider for attack. The first base to receive aircraft was TAC's Homestead AFB, Florida, with two B-52s and two KC-135s going on alert there on 20 February. This service test lasted until 20 May. The results were satisfactory and the aircraft remained on alert. This was to be followed on 1 July 1969 by satelliting alert aircraft at eight more bases. An additional 23 would be utilized starting at various times from October 1969 to January 1971.

(4) In the future, SAC was to lose Columbus AFB, Mississippi, to the Air Training Command (ATC) on 1 July 1969. The transfer agreement was signed on 4 December 1968, and by the end of June 1969 aircraft and personnel had been moved except for the newly organized 4140ABS that was left to complete the transfer actions. Three more owned bases were to be lost in mid-1970 with Blytheville AFB, Arkansas, and Dyess AFB, Texas, being transferred to TAC, and Clinton-Sherman AFB, Oklahoma, inactivated. In mid-1971 SAC was to move from two tenant bases: Kincheloe AFB, Michigan and Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Kincheloe belonged to ADC and Wright-Patterson to the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).
Personnel

(U) The command's authorized and assigned strength declined during FY-69. This was attributed to inactivation of units in connection with the loss of two air bases, transfer of personnel to the gaining commands, early release of first term airmen, and an overall manpower reduction. As a result, manning of authorized positions was cut from 99 percent in June 1968 to 91 percent in 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1968</td>
<td>Authorized 160,267</td>
<td>22,947</td>
<td>183,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>161,921</td>
<td>20,215</td>
<td>182,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1969</td>
<td>Authorized 156,030</td>
<td>21,593</td>
<td>177,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>142,124</td>
<td>19,191</td>
<td>161,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Authorized - 4,237</td>
<td>-1,354</td>
<td>-5,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>-19,197</td>
<td>-1,024</td>
<td>-20,821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The greatest loss occurred in assigned airmen; the total dropped by 18,253, from 136,742 to 118,489. The major portion of these cuts were directed by USAF in an effort to keep assignments within the strength and man-year ceilings established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The total reduction was 13,698 first term airmen, the separation dates of some being advanced as much as eleven months in a three phase program accomplished between November 1968 and May 1969. Another loss occurred when Altus and Homestead were transferred and 2,666 airmen went to the gaining commands. The overall reduction, directed by USAF, was known as Project 693. Effective in October 1968, a total of 1,374 spaces were taken from SAC: 1,317 military and 47 civilian.
Organization

Organizational Changes, FY-69

(U) The basic SAC organization consisted of the headquarters at Offutt AFB, three numbered air forces in the CONUS and one air division overseas. These elements did not change during FY-69. Under these major subordinate commands were air divisions, wings, groups, and squadrons. Some changes occurred in those categories.

(U) The number of air divisions was reduced from 16 to 15 when the 18th Strategic Aerospace Division (SAD) was discontinued on 2 July. This was one of a series of actions that would cut the total number of divisions from 21 on 30 June 1966 to 12 in 1970, and paralleled the reduction in operational wings. The division, at Fairchild AFB, Washington, had three assigned wings: the 6th Strategic Aerospace Wing (SAW), 92SAW, and 341st Strategic Missile Wing (SMW). These were transferred to jurisdiction of the 12th Air Division (AD), 14SAD, and 810SAD, respectively. The CONUS air divisions and their related wings are shown on the map on the following page.

(U) SAC had 30 operational B-52 wings on 30 June 1968, but only 27 a year later. Two were discontinued 25 July 1968: the 465BW Bombardment Wing (BW), Robins AFB, Georgia, and the 450BW, Minot AFB, North Dakota. The 465th was replaced at Robins by the 19BW that moved from Homestead, while the 450th was replaced by the 5BW from Travis AFB, California. A third B-52 wing was lost when the 11SFW was redesignated the 11th Air Refueling Wing (ARW) on 25 July, followed by inactivation in March 1969, leaving only the 11th Air Refueling Squadron (ARS) at Altus AFB, Oklahoma.

* (U) The 6AD, 822AD, 813SAD, 819SAD, and 13SMD were discontinued in 1966. In July 1969 the 42AD and 51AD would be discontinued, per SAC SO G-52, 8 April 1969, and the last inactivation would be the 40AD in 1970.
directly to the headquarters, such as the 54th Aerospace Reconnaissance Technical Wing, were still given individual treatment, as were other one-of-a-kind units, like the 340th Bombardment Group. These revised mission directives were then combined into SAC Manual 23-3, "Directory of Strategic Air Command Organizations". That publication then superseded all other mission regulations.

(U) In addition to the above units, SAC had 64 detachments at the end of FY-69, an increase of nine, offset by a reduction of three. One discontinued was Detachment 4, 1st Combat Evaluation Group (CEG), Oronogo, Missouri. It was the second detachment of the 1CEG to be inactivated in 1968. For reasons of economy, CSAF directed SAC to close one detachment. The Oronogo site was selected due to its limited capability to support low altitude navigation and bombardment training. CSAF approved, and a program directive was published in September. Scoring activity stopped on 15 December, the equipment was moved, and the detachment inactivated on 25 January. The other two reductions were Detachments 3 and 19, 3902nd Support Squadron, at Altus and Homestead AFBs, where Manpower Evaluation Teams were no longer required. The increase of nine detachments was to provide personnel to support satellite basing.

Planned Changes

(8) At the end of FY-69 preparations were complete to accomplish other major changes in the air division and wing structure on 2 July 1969. At that time the deactivation of the 454BW would occur at Columbus AFB, Mississippi, coinciding with the movement of SAC from that base. In addition, two air divisions, the 42d at Blytheville AFB and the 57AD at Westover AFB were to be inactivated. At the same time, at the suggestion of the Eighth Air Force, the 38GSAW at Plattsburgh AFB, New York, was to move from the 45AD to the 817AD, thus placing both wings (the other was the 509BW) scheduled to have FB-111s under the same air division.
Command Structure Studies

(U) Intensive study was made of the SAC organizational structure during FY-69, particularly in the area of numbered air force and air divisions. While four studies and a reorganization plan were prepared the original incentive stemmed from a DOD directive of 1965. At that time the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, directed that CINCSAC and JCS "determine what savings could be achieved without impairing operational effectiveness."\(^{114}\)

When he sent the study to USAF in March 1966, General John D. Ryan, CINCSAC, agreed that the alternate command role of the numbered air forces duplicated the existing organization needed for peacetime operation, but added that their cost was insignificant as they provided additional survivability in case of emergency. He recognized that there were some deficiencies in alignment of wings and air divisions, and consequently made four recommendations:\(^{115}\)

- (U) Retain three numbered air forces with each NAF retaining an alternate command post capability.
- (U) Reduce the manpower authorization in each NAF by approximately 10%.
- (U) Inactivate or realign the questionable air divisions.
- (U) Reduce the number of SAC air divisions from the present 21 to 12 by FY 71.

\(^{116}\) Headquarters agreed that the three numbered air forces should be retained, and in July 1966 sent a note to JCS approving their retention. The JCS and OSD concurred.\(^{117}\) However, Headquarters USAF deleted the manpower reduction discussion when reporting to JCS, feeling this was an internal matter. However, it did accept SAC's recommendation to cut the numbered air forces by ten percent (imposed in October 1967), and the realignment and reduction of air divisions.

\(^{118}\) The next initiative came from Major General Hewitt Wheless, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF. In February 1968 he said that it was necessary to study the problem again. He suggested several alternatives: maintain status quo, retain three numbered air forces and eliminate all air divisions, retain two numbered air forces and
retain air divisions. Other alternatives could be considered, and all were to have reasonable time schedules for implementation.\textsuperscript{118}

(U) The CINC assigned responsibility for studying these alternatives to the Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/Plans, and a working group was assembled from the headquarters staff.\textsuperscript{119} The numbered air forces were also asked to submit studies using the three basic alternatives of USAF as well as others proposed by SAC.\textsuperscript{120}

(U) Eliminate one NAF and increase the number of air divisions; e.g., assign one air division to each two wing base and one for every three single-wing bases or tenant wings.

(U) Eliminate in each NAF the functions which can be centrally controlled by higher headquarters.

(U) Across the board percentage reduction in all three NAF's.

(U) Retain the NAF's and eliminate air divisions except on two-wing bases.

(U) Combination of the above.

\(\diamond\) It soon became apparent that SAC would have to make a decision on how a reduction could be made with the least amount of disruption. In late April, Headquarters USAF asked for assistance in answering an Air Staff proposal to eliminate the air divisions in the first quarter of FY-69, followed by inactivation of the Second Air Force in the third quarter. This was one of several actions which would help the Air Force absorb a budget cut of $8 million in 1969.\textsuperscript{121} SAC did not agree that a numbered air force could be deleted in FY-69 without degradation of the SAC capability, although it might be feasible in FY-72 or later, depending largely on whether or not the Vietnam War had ended.\textsuperscript{122} Since the impetus for the Air Staff query came from an OSD request, the Secretary of the Air Force recommended that no decision on elimination of an air force be made until SAC could complete its study in August.\textsuperscript{123}

\(\diamond\) The completed report examined three alternatives suggested by General Wheless in his February 1968 letter and two others added by SAC.\textsuperscript{124}
(F) Retain two numbered air forces and retain air divisions using the criteria of one air division to each two-wing base and one for every three single wing base or tenant wing.

(G) Retain three numbered air forces and eliminate air divisions except on two-wing bases.

In forwarding the study, General Nazzaro said that it was desirable to retain the existing structure through the next several years due to the demands being imposed by the SEA conflict; and because of the repositioning and training that would result from planned changes, such as the acquisition of the FB-111, satellite basing, and Minuteman modifications. The study was reviewed at Headquarters USAF and the SAC officers briefed it to the Air Staff Board in mid-August. The SAC position for three, rather than two, numbered air forces, was found to be not sufficiently substantiated, and the command was asked to revise it. Headquarters USAF provided operations analysts to assist SAC, and set a target date of early October for completion of the study.

(U) The second study was completed on time and presented to both the Headquarters USAF Strategic Panel and the Air Staff Board. The five alternatives outlined above were discussed, plus a sixth: the phasing out of one numbered air force in either FY-70/72 to FY-71/72. The study, General Holloway's letter transmitting it, and the briefing given to the Board, all emphasized the need to retain the existing structure for the next few years, reiterating the earlier statements of General Nazzaro. This was indorsed by both the Secretary of the Air Force and the JCS. No immediate response came from OSD, but in early February CSAF directed that SAC develop a plan for reduction of a numbered air force or an acceptable alternative.

(U) Four ways of accomplishing a one-third reduction were considered, although SAC favored the fourth:

(U) Retain three numbered air forces, but impose an across-the-board reduction ... by one-third.
(U) Retain three numbered air forces but specialize. Designate one . . . a "Missile" . . . the other two "Aircraft" . . . .* 

(U) Eliminate one . . . and specialize the remaining two. Assign all missile units (9) to one and all aircraft units (approximately 30) to the other. 

(U) Eliminate one numbered air force and apply semi-specialization. Assign all missile and reconnaissance units and some bomber/tanker units to one numbered air force. Assign the FB-111/B-58 and the bulk of bomber/tanker units to the other. 

(* In early April a Headquarters SAC working group convened to develop the general details of a plan which would be implemented only upon direction from higher headquarters. The plan itself was published on 10 June 1969, and provided for retention of the Fifteenth Air Force at March AFB, California, and discontinuance of either the Eighth at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, or the Second, at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Semi-specialization would be attained by assigning of all reconnaissance and missile wings, plus a few B-52 units, to the Fifteenth. The remaining air force would get the FB-111, B-58, and the majority of the B-52 wings. With this arrangement SAC hoped to save 1511 spaces and $15.3 million annually after the first year. Thus, at the end of Fiscal Year 1969 a plan was ready, but no directive had been received on implementation. 

* * *

(U) Work had been done on a plan for a one missile/two aircraft numbered air force organization. Three options were considered: (1) retain Second AF at Barksdale AFB, and convert it to a missile air force; (2) convert Second to a missile air force and relocate it from Barksdale to F E Warren AFB; (3) reconfigure 1st Strategic Aerospace Division to a missile air force and redesignate it as the Second Air Force. Consideration had also been given to assigning the 1st Strategic Aerospace Division to the Fifteenth, but this plan, like the specialized air force plan, would not provide substantial savings, and was not accepted.
Command

(U) On 29 July 1968 General Joseph J. Nazzaro, Commander-in-Chief, SAC, moved to the position of Commander, Pacific Air Forces, and General Bruce K. Holloway, former Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, became CINCSAC.\textsuperscript{140} Attending the change of command ceremony were General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, USAF, Governor Norbert A. Tiemann of Nebraska, and the commanders of the three numbered air forces.\textsuperscript{141} (Chart 6, this history, lists SAC staff officer changes.)

(U) Command of the Second and Eighth Air Forces did not change; they were headed by Lieutenant Generals Austin J. Russell and William B. Kieffer, respectively. At the Fifteenth Air Force, Lieutenant General William K. Martin was replaced by Lieutenant General J. J. Catton on 1 August 1968.\textsuperscript{140} Major General P. K. Carlton assumed command of the First Strategic Aerospace Division on 15 March 1969, replacing Colonel George Pfeiffer, Jr.\textsuperscript{143} Colonel Bill H. Martin remained as commander of the 98th Strategic Wing.

(\(\mathcal{Y}\)) The Continuity of Operations Plan (COP 198) provided for continuity of command for SAC under attack conditions. The plan had first been published in September 1967.\textsuperscript{144} It was amended twice in FY-68.\textsuperscript{145} Changes in headquarters staff positions and numbered air force commanders made necessary amendments three and four.\textsuperscript{146} Amendment five deleted the position of Senior Emergency Action Officer (SEAO) that had been instituted in January 1967.\textsuperscript{147} The SEAO was one of five named officers required to be present for duty if SAC's commander and vice-commander were absent. This deletion followed by another amendment, changed the procedures applicable under one of the three conditions that might exist: Condition Bravo, Modified (see table 6, following page). This made the DCS/Operations responsible for emergency actions, rather than the SEAO, until the arrival of the next in command. The position of Airborne Emergency Action Officer (AEAO), shown in the table, was shared by SAC general officers based on a schedule prepared by DCS/Personnel.\textsuperscript{148} With a battle staff, they participated in the airborne command post...
### TABLE 6

SUCCESSION OF COMMAND, COP 198
30 June 1969

**CONDITION ALFA:** Hq SAC incapacitated, requires alternate command facility to take immediate emergency actions to enhance the survivability of the SAC forces and/or carry out NCA/JCS directives.

- Airborne Command Post: Airborne Emergency Action Officer.
- Second Air Force Auxiliary Command Post: Alternate Airborne Emergency Action Officer.
- Numbered Air Force: Succession of command as defined under CONDITION BRAVO.

**CONDITION BRAVO:** Command cannot emanate from CINCSAC or VCINCSAC, and initial emergency actions for survival of SAC forces have been completed under CONDITION ALFA.


In accordance with AFR 35-54, "Rank, Precedence, and Command," 13 Sep 61, as amended.

**CONDITION BRAVO, MODIFIED:** Command cannot emanate from CINCSAC or VCINCSAC, but CONDITION ALFA has not occurred.

DCS/Operations will take emergency action necessary and notify

Ranking SAC Headquarters General Officer, who will assume command until arrival of

Successor as under CONDITION BRAVO.
General McConnell arrives at Offutt AFB for change of command ceremony. Left to Right: General McConnell, General Nazzaro, General Holloway.
SEATING ARRANGEMENT
(First Row Only)

(Left to Right, As Follows)

General McConnell

General Holloway

General Nazzaro

Lt General Compton

Vice Admiral Gayler

Lt General Martin

Lt General Russell

Lt General Kieffer

Lt General Catton
operation, "Looking Glass," and were required to have a thorough knowledge of emergency war orders. ¹⁴⁹

Summary

During Fiscal Year 1969 SAC continued to be responsible for strategic aerospace operations through use of missiles and aircraft capable of delivery of either nuclear or nonnuclear weapons. The command's assets, consisting of weapons systems, personnel, and bases were reduced, continuing a downward trend that had begun in early 1960. While the missile force had been increased and modernized by the introduction of the Minuteman I and II during those years, the strategic heavy bomber force had been cut. The loss of the last B-47 in 1966 was followed by retirement of the early B-52 models, an action that continued in FY-69. No new bombers entered the inventory during this time; however, SAC was to receive the FB-111A medium bomber in another year which would offset partially the loss of the B-58 which was scheduled to occur in the next three years.

There were corresponding decreases in personnel and in facilities. Military and civilian strength had declined since reaching its highest in 1962, and continued this trend in FY-69, the result of strategic force cuts, budget reductions, and transfer of bases to other commands. Reducing the number of heavy bomber wings permitted release of bases for either use by other commands, inactivation, or return to civil authorities. To offset this reduction in the number of potential targets, satellite basing of two to four bombers was tested and approved at one non-SAC base in FY-69. It was to extend to other non-SAC bases in the following years.

The only major organizational change was the reduction of one air division, one of a series of actions which would reduce the total number of divisions from 21 to 12 over a period of four years, from FY-66 to FY-70. Studies that could lead to command-wide reorganization were accomplished at the request of higher headquarters; however, no implementing instructions had been received by the end of June 1969.
FOOTNOTES

1. AFR 23-12, "Organization and Mission - Field, Strategic Air Command (SAC)," 10 Jan 66; Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 66, Ex 3.


3. Doc., "SAC Basic War Plan," 1 Jul 68 (68-B-2545); Amendment 1, 27 Dec 68.

4. Doc., "SAC Basic War Plan," 1 Jul 66 (66-B-1364); Amendment 1, 22 Sep 66 (66-B-3100); Amendment 2, 25 Oct 66 (66-B-3615); Amendment 3, 20 Feb 67.


7. Ltr, Col Vergil H. Bates, AFXOSS Hq USAF to Hq SAC (DPL), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 24 Sep 68, Ex 5.

8. Ltr, Col Arthur L. Hughes, DPLF Hq SAC to Hq USAF (AFXOSS), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 26 Nov 68, Ex 6.


10. Ltr, Col Arthur L. Hughes, DPLF Hq SAC to Hq TAC (DPLR), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 5 Feb 69, Ex 7.

11. Ltr, Col William T. Bolt, DPL Hq TAC to CINCSAC (DPLF), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 18 Feb 69, Ex 8.

12. Ltr, Col Arthur L. Hughes, DPLF Hq SAC to Hq TAC (DPLR), "Revision of AFR 23-12," 20 May 69, Ex 9; ltr, Col Arthur L. Hughes, DPLF Hq SAC to Hq USAF (AFXOSS), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 20 May 69, Ex 10.


14. Msg, SAC (DPL) to CSAF (AFXOSS), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 23/2030Z May 69 (69-B-0265), Ex 11.

15. AFR 23-12, "Organization and Mission - Field, Strategic Air Command (SAC)," 10 Jan 66, para 5.1.
16. Msg, SAC (DPL) to CSAF (AFXOSS), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 23/2030Z May 69 (69-B-0265), Ex 11.

17. Msg, SAC (DPL) to CSAF (AFXOSS), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 26/1454Z Jun 69 (69-B-1531), Ex 12.


19. Msg, SAC (DPL) to CSAF (AFXOSS), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 26/1454Z Jun 69 (69-B-1531), Ex 12.

20. Msg, CSAF (AFXOSS) to SAC (DPL), "Revision to AFR 23-12," 05/2005 Jun 69; msg, CSAF (AFXOSS) to ADC (ADLDC), "Revision of AFR 23-12," 13/16512 Jun 69.


24. The transfer of aircraft from March and Dyess AFBs started 12 May and was completed 26 June 1969. See Chapter III, this history.

25. Inventory by type and model may be found in Chart 9, this history.


27. Missiles are discussed in Chapter IV, this history.


31. SACR 23-14, "Organization and Mission - Field, Strategic Air Command (SAC)," 10 Jan 66, par 3.b.; Ex 3, Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 66.


34. Ibid.

35. Ltr, Gen John P. McConnell, C/S USAF to SAFOS, "DPM on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," 24 Aug 68 (68-DPLR-123); memo, Harold Brown, SecAF to SecDef, "Draft Memorandum for the President on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," 26 Aug 68 (68-B-2821).


37. Memo, Paul H. Nitze, DepSecDef to SecAF, "Recent Program Decisions," 4 Dec 68; Doc., F-8-096, "Program Change Decision (B-58)," 24 Dec 68, Ex 15.
38. Doc., F-8-122, "Program Change Decision (B-52C/F)," 18 Oct 68, Ex 16.
39. Doc., Z-8-119, "Program Change Decision (B-52C/F)," 26 Dec 68, Ex 17.
40. Msg, USAF (AFOAPOC) to SAC (DPL), "Program Changes (B-52)," 17/1614Z Apr 69, Ex 18.
41. Extract, Doc., F-9-006 (SEA), "Program Change Decision (B-52)," 29 May 69, Ex 19.
42. Doc., 68-177, Program Change Request, "Reclama to ASW DPM (B-52 Aerial Mining Capability)," 12 Aug 68.
43. Doc., F-8-093/094, "Program Change Decision "B-52 Aerial Mining,"
30 Sep 68, Ex 20.
44. Ltr, Harold Brown, SecAF to Paul H. Nitze, DepSecDef, "[retention of B-52D for aerial mining]," 22 Oct 68, Ex 21.
45. Doc., F-9-034, "Program Change Request [B-52 Aerial Mining],"
30 Jul 69, Ex 22.
46. (1) Memo, Col W. Y. Smith, Military Assistance, SecAF, "Termination of FB-111 Procurement (S)," 30 Sep 68, Ex 23.
49. Memo, Paul H. Nitze, DepSecDef to SecAF, "Recent Program Decisions," 4 Dec 68.
52. Ltr, Maj Gen S. F. Martin, DPL Hq SAC to Command Section, "AMSA Development Status," 20 Nov 68.


56. Ltr, Gen B. K. Holloway, CINCSAC to JCS (Chairman), "Commander's Foreword (SAC JSOP 71-78)," 7 Oct 68 (68-B-3118).


62. DAF SO GA-30, 28 May 68; SAC SO G-114, 26 Jun 68; doc., "Basic Agreement and Amendment 1 for the Transfer of Altus Air Force Base from Strategic Air Command to Military Airlift Command," 18 Oct 67, 6 Dec 67, and Amendment 2, 5 Apr 68.

63. The previous history identified six excess bases; however, three were dropped as SAC retained accountability for only minor portions, such as housing areas, which were awaiting disposition: Larson AFB, Wash., Lincoln AFB, Neb., and Walker AFB, N. Mex. Both Larson and Lincoln were inactivated as Air Force installations per DAF SO GA-60, 16 Aug 66 and DAF SO GA-103, 19 Dec 66, respectively. These deletions and the transfer of Dow reduced the excess list to two.

64. 4251ABS, Dow AFB, Me., activated 25 Jun 68, per Hq SAC SO G-57, 2 Apr 68; inactivated 2 Dec 68, per Hq SAC SO G-159, 5 Sep 68. SAC Special Orders, G-series may be found in Exhibit 1 of each history.

65. DAF SO GA-45, 26 Jul 68.
66. Ltr, Col G. D. Fremouw, DCS/CE Hq SAC to Command Section, "Project Seed Corn," 17 Dec 68.

67. 4257ABS, Glasgow AFB, Mont, organized 25 Jun 68 per Hq SAC SO G-57, 2 Apr 68.


69. Doc., "Satellite Basing Test Plan 69-1, 1 Apr 69; Det 1, 72BW was designated and organized at Homestead AFB, Fla, per Hq SAC SO G-31, 14 Feb 69.


72. 4140ABS, Columbus AFB, Miss, organized 2 Jul 69 per Hq SAC SO G-56, 11 Apr 69, and discontinued 2 Oct 69, per Hq SAC SO G-117, 4 Aug 69.


75. PCN C 6505G and PCN C 1308A (military); SAC Q-4 (civilian). See also Chart 4, this history.


77. Msg, SAC (DPLM2) to CSAF (AFOMOAC, AFOMOAB), "FY 69 Operations Reduction (Project 693)," 22/2146Z Aug 68.


79. Hq SAC SO G-51, 1 Apr 68; msg, 18SAD to SAC, "Inactivation of 16th Strategic Aerospace Division," 02/13412 Jul 68, Ex 30.
80. Hq SAC SO G-121, 15 Jul 68.

81. Hq SAC SO G-95, 31 May 68.

82. Hq SAC MO-6, 12 Jun 68. Movement Orders are included in Exhibit 2 of each SAC history.

83. Hq SAC MO-7, 12 Jun 68.


85. Hq SAC SO G-27, 10 Feb 69.

86. Hq SAC SO G-79, 8 May 68.


88. Hq SAC SO G-79, 8 May 68.

89. Hq SAC SO G-105, 25 Jun 68; Hq SAC SO G-122, 14 Jul 68.

90. Hq SAC SO G-90, 27 May 68.

91. The 11th and 19th Service, Civil Engineering, Supply, and Transportation Squadrons were discontinued. Hq SAC SO G-79, 8 May 68; Hq SAC SO G-105, 25 Jun 68; Hq SAC SO G-122, 15 Jul 68.

92. Hq SAC SO G-95, 21 May 68.


94. Hq SAC SO G-141, 20 Aug 68.

95. Hq SAC SO G-9, 16 Jan 69.


100. Det 13, Ellisville, Miss, discontinued 2 Jun 68; Hist SAC, Jan-Jun 68, pp. 14-17.


102. Msg, SAC (DPLF) to CSAF (AFOAPOA), "FY-69 Manpower Reduction (Project 693)," 05/2020 Sep 68.

103. Msg, CSAF (AFOAPOA) to SAC (DPLF), "Inactivation of RBS Site," 12/1917Z Sep 68; msg, CSAF (AFOAPOA) to SAC (DPLF), "Inactivation of RBS Site," 10/2130 Oct 68.

104. Msg, SAC (DPLF) to 1CEG, "Program Directive - Program for Det 4, 1CEG," 18/1908 Sep 68.


106. Hq SAC SO G-1, 3 Jan 69.


108. Hq SAC SO G-13, 22 Jan 69; SAC SO G-31, 14 Feb 69.

109. Hq SAC SO G-56, 11 Apr 69; Hq SAC SO G-72, 5 May 69.

110. Hq SAC SO G-52, 8 Apr 69.

111. Msg, 8AF to SAC, "Division Alignment," 01/1501Z May 69, Ex 31.

112. Msg, DPL Hq SAC to CSAF, "SAC Air Division Program," 30/1940Z Jan 69, Ex 32; msg, USAF (AFOAPOA) to SAC, "SAC Air Division Program," 04/2049Z Feb 69, Ex 33.

113. Hq SAC SO G-70, 2 May 69.

114. Doc., JCS 2303/312-3, "Report by the J-6 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Strategic Air Command Communications," 21 Oct 65, w/Atch, Memorandum, Cyrus Vance, DepSecDef to CINCSAC, "Strategic
Air Command Communications," 8 Dec 65, w/Atch, SecDef Program Change Decision, 2-5-053, 3 Dec 65; Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 65, pp. 39-44.


121. Memo for Record, "[numbered air force studies]," by Col Aubrey M. Bobbitt, DCS/Plans Hq SAC, 29 Apr 68 msg, CSAF (AFOCC-MO) to SAC, "[proposed reductions]," 08/2028Z May 68; msg, SAC (CS) to 2AF (C), et al, "SAC Intermediate Command Structure," 09/1643 May 68, Ex 38; msg, CSAF (AFOMOBB) to SAC, "SAC Command Structure," 17/2210Z Jun 68, Ex 39.

122. Msg, SAC (CS) to CSAF (APODC-MO), "SAC Command Structure," 15/2052 May 68, Ex 40; msg, SAC (DPLM) to CSAF, "SAC Command Structure," 21/1624 Jun 68, Ex 41.

123. Ltr, Col Thomas B. Hoxie, AFOMOBB Hq USAF to SAC, "SAC Command Structure," 26 Jun 68.


128. Memo for the Record, "Visitation by Operational Analyst Representatives from Hq USAF," by Maj Thomas H. Disch, Jr., DPLM Hq SAC, 19 Sep 68, w/2 Atch, Ex 45; ltr, Clayton J. Thomas, AFGOAR Hq USAF to SAC (DPLM), "Draft Version of AFGOAR Staff Members' Visit to Hq SAC, 17-18 September 1968," 26 Sep 68, w/1 Atch, Ex 46.

129. Msg, CSAF (AFOMOBB) to SAC (DPL), "SAC Command Structure Study," 25/2143Z Sep 68.

130. Memo for Record, "Presentation of Briefing on the SAC Intermediate Command Structure Study, 4 Oct 68, to Hq USAF Strategic Panel and Air Staff Board," by Maj Thomas H. Disch, Jr., DPLM Hq SAC, 10 Oct 68, w/4 Atch, Ex 47.


134. Memo, Harold Brown, SecAF to DepSecDef, "Reduction in the Number of SAC Numbered Air Forces," 1 Nov 68, Ex 50.


142. DAF SO AA-1214, 7 Aug 68.

143. DAF SO AA-202, 26 Feb 69.


146. Amendments to COP 198: #3, 1 Aug 68; #4, 13 Aug 68; #5, 14 Oct 68; ltr, Maj Gen J. B. Knapp, C/S HQ SAC to DP, et al, "SAC COP 198," 14 Nov 68; Ex 52.


149. Ltr, Gen B. K. Holloway, CINCSAC to Airborne Emergency Action Officer, "Operation of Looking Glass," 8 Oct 68, Ex 62.